1. Introduction and Summary
Catechesis of adults must involve accurate, perspicuous presentations of the teachings of the Church. This is especially so in the area of sin and conscience. I have had some misgivings concerning the notion of "fundamental option" when it is included in this context.
Theologians which present fundamental-option (FO) theories (there are several such theories, not just one) have not presented a precise definition of what is meant by FO. The gamut of definitions can be found in Germain Grisez' treatise on moral theology [GG pp. 382 et seq.]
In what follows, we may regard FO as meaning an overall orientation (either toward God or away from God) which has become manifest in a person as he lives out his life. Regardless of the fuzziness of its definition(s), the concept is certainly valid, since we are commanded by God through the teaching Church and through scripture to live a lifetime here on earth saying "yes" to the Father by conducting ourselves, with the help of the Holy Spirit, just as Jesus did.
My misgivings stem from presenting FO in the context of defining mortal sin. It can be easily misunderstood in this context as asserting that when a person whose FO has been for God throughout his life, and then commits an act which includes the elements which the Church teaches are present for that act to be a mortal sin, then the previous God-oriented FO can in certain circumstances mitigate the sinfulness of that act so that it is not a mortal sin after all.
Such an inference is against the teaching of the Church on mortal sin, as stated clearly in [PH] and [VS]. It has also been condemned by scripture itself; cf. Ezekiel 18: 21-29 (Section 3.).
Section 2 delineates some viewpoints of FO proponents, and Grisez' critique of difficulties associated with those viewpoints. Section 3 discusses the presentation of FO in the context of adult catechesis of sin and conscience. A recommendation is presented in Section 4.
The appendices present relatively long pericopes from [PH] and [VS], to provide a context for quotations taken from them.
2. Just What is "Fundamental Option" ?
Germain Grisez [GG pp. 382-383] describes more than one FO theory. I will quote in part his description of FO which I believe is the one most commonly understood. The other FO theories are more nebulous and (as he implies) are somewhat mysterious, making precise definitions difficult.
Grisez describes the viewpoint of FO proponents in passages such as the following:
...a person in friendship with God is disposed toward him not simply by a particular act but in his or her whole being. This comprehensive orientation is a FO, which is somehow different from and much deeper than any ordinary choice. From this the proponents of this view conclude that no ordinary choice of itself can reverse one's FO.
...although the sin is perfect as a choice, the bad will which it involves might not be sufficient to reverse the whole thrust of one's being....
The basic commitment (involved in FO) is supposed to establish a predominant thrust or momentum, such that occasional acts incompatible with it usually cannot radically alter or reverse it.
Grisez then expounds in detail the numerous and serious flaws of the various FO theories. In particular, he states:
Those who think of FO as a basic commitment try to show that everyone makes such a commitment. However, they fail to demonstrate this [GG p. 386].
Grisez states further:
Proponents (of FO) acknowledge the distinction between grave and light matter made by the common teaching of the Church, but they deny that grave matter, sufficient reflection, and full consent really suffice for a mortal sin, one which necessarily subverts a good fundamental option [GG p. 389].
The Council of Trent definitively taught that grave matter, sufficient reflection, and full consent of the will suffice for the commission of a mortal sin; it added no further qualifications (such as FO). The denial of this teaching by proponents of FO directly contradicts a solemnly promulgated conciliar teaching, and therefore constitutes prima facie heresy.
3. Fundamental Option and Mortal Sin
To repeat, the church's teaching (as promulgated by the Council of Trent) as to what constitutes a mortal sin is succinctly summarized as follows:
A person is guilty of a mortal sin when he commits an act which involves all three of the following elements:
1. a grievous offense (i.e., grave matter);
2. sufficient reflection;
3. full consent of the will.
If one of these elements is missing, then the person either commits a venial sin, or else commits no sin at all.
Consider the following two statements:
Statement 1--
Suppose a person has faithfully performed the will of God throughout his life; that is, his fundamental option has been for God. Suppose further that that person commits an act which involves a grievous offense, sufficient reflection, and full consent of the will. Then that person has not necessarily committed a mortal sin.
Statement 2--
Suppose a person has faithfully performed the will of God throughout his life; that is, his fundamental option has been for God. Suppose further that that person commits an act which involves a grievous offense, sufficient reflection, and full consent of the will. Then that person, by a single act, has radically changed his fundamental option away from God and has indeed committed a mortal sin.
Statement 1 has been specifically condemned by Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Veritatis Splendor, and by the Declaration Persona Humana, to name just two documents of the church (cf. appendices). It has also been condemned by scripture itself in Ezekiel 18: 21-29 (v.i.).
The separation of fundamental option from deliberate choices of particular kinds of behavior, disordered in themselves or in their circumstances, which would not engage that option, thus involves a denial of Catholic doctrine on mortal sin.
Catechesis of adults must involve accurate, perspicuous presentations of the teachings of the Church. This is especially so in the area of sin and conscience. I have had some misgivings concerning the notion of "fundamental option" when it is included in this context.
Theologians which present fundamental-option (FO) theories (there are several such theories, not just one) have not presented a precise definition of what is meant by FO. The gamut of definitions can be found in Germain Grisez' treatise on moral theology [GG pp. 382 et seq.]
In what follows, we may regard FO as meaning an overall orientation (either toward God or away from God) which has become manifest in a person as he lives out his life. Regardless of the fuzziness of its definition(s), the concept is certainly valid, since we are commanded by God through the teaching Church and through scripture to live a lifetime here on earth saying "yes" to the Father by conducting ourselves, with the help of the Holy Spirit, just as Jesus did.
My misgivings stem from presenting FO in the context of defining mortal sin. It can be easily misunderstood in this context as asserting that when a person whose FO has been for God throughout his life, and then commits an act which includes the elements which the Church teaches are present for that act to be a mortal sin, then the previous God-oriented FO can in certain circumstances mitigate the sinfulness of that act so that it is not a mortal sin after all.
Such an inference is against the teaching of the Church on mortal sin, as stated clearly in [PH] and [VS]. It has also been condemned by scripture itself; cf. Ezekiel 18: 21-29 (Section 3.).
Section 2 delineates some viewpoints of FO proponents, and Grisez' critique of difficulties associated with those viewpoints. Section 3 discusses the presentation of FO in the context of adult catechesis of sin and conscience. A recommendation is presented in Section 4.
The appendices present relatively long pericopes from [PH] and [VS], to provide a context for quotations taken from them.
2. Just What is "Fundamental Option" ?
Germain Grisez [GG pp. 382-383] describes more than one FO theory. I will quote in part his description of FO which I believe is the one most commonly understood. The other FO theories are more nebulous and (as he implies) are somewhat mysterious, making precise definitions difficult.
Grisez describes the viewpoint of FO proponents in passages such as the following:
...a person in friendship with God is disposed toward him not simply by a particular act but in his or her whole being. This comprehensive orientation is a FO, which is somehow different from and much deeper than any ordinary choice. From this the proponents of this view conclude that no ordinary choice of itself can reverse one's FO.
...although the sin is perfect as a choice, the bad will which it involves might not be sufficient to reverse the whole thrust of one's being....
The basic commitment (involved in FO) is supposed to establish a predominant thrust or momentum, such that occasional acts incompatible with it usually cannot radically alter or reverse it.
Grisez then expounds in detail the numerous and serious flaws of the various FO theories. In particular, he states:
Those who think of FO as a basic commitment try to show that everyone makes such a commitment. However, they fail to demonstrate this [GG p. 386].
Grisez states further:
Proponents (of FO) acknowledge the distinction between grave and light matter made by the common teaching of the Church, but they deny that grave matter, sufficient reflection, and full consent really suffice for a mortal sin, one which necessarily subverts a good fundamental option [GG p. 389].
The Council of Trent definitively taught that grave matter, sufficient reflection, and full consent of the will suffice for the commission of a mortal sin; it added no further qualifications (such as FO). The denial of this teaching by proponents of FO directly contradicts a solemnly promulgated conciliar teaching, and therefore constitutes prima facie heresy.
3. Fundamental Option and Mortal Sin
To repeat, the church's teaching (as promulgated by the Council of Trent) as to what constitutes a mortal sin is succinctly summarized as follows:
A person is guilty of a mortal sin when he commits an act which involves all three of the following elements:
1. a grievous offense (i.e., grave matter);
2. sufficient reflection;
3. full consent of the will.
If one of these elements is missing, then the person either commits a venial sin, or else commits no sin at all.
Consider the following two statements:
Statement 1--
Suppose a person has faithfully performed the will of God throughout his life; that is, his fundamental option has been for God. Suppose further that that person commits an act which involves a grievous offense, sufficient reflection, and full consent of the will. Then that person has not necessarily committed a mortal sin.
Statement 2--
Suppose a person has faithfully performed the will of God throughout his life; that is, his fundamental option has been for God. Suppose further that that person commits an act which involves a grievous offense, sufficient reflection, and full consent of the will. Then that person, by a single act, has radically changed his fundamental option away from God and has indeed committed a mortal sin.
Statement 1 has been specifically condemned by Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Veritatis Splendor, and by the Declaration Persona Humana, to name just two documents of the church (cf. appendices). It has also been condemned by scripture itself in Ezekiel 18: 21-29 (v.i.).
The separation of fundamental option from deliberate choices of particular kinds of behavior, disordered in themselves or in their circumstances, which would not engage that option, thus involves a denial of Catholic doctrine on mortal sin.
With the whole tradition of the Church, we call mortal sin the act by which man freely and consciously rejects God, his law, the covenant of love that God offers, preferring to turn in on himself or to some created and finite reality, something contrary to the divine will (conversio ad creaturam). This can occur in a direct and formal way, in the sins of idolatry, apostasy and atheism; or in an equivalent way, as in every act of disobedience to God's commandments in a grave matter. . ([VS] Section 70)
In reality, it is precisely the fundamental option which in the last resort defines a person's moral disposition. But it can be completely changed by particular acts, especially when, as often happens, these have been prepared for by previous more superficial acts. Whatever the case, it is wrong to say that particular acts are not enough to constitute mortal sin. ([PH] third paragraph)
Statement 2 conveys the orthodox teaching of the church, as we see from [VS]:
It thus needs to be stated that the so-called fundamental option, to the extent that it is distinct from a generic intention and hence one not yet determined in such a way that freedom is obligated, is always brought into play through conscious and free decisions. Precisely for this reason, it is revoked when man engages his freedom in conscious decisions to the contrary, with regard to morally grave matter. ([VS] Section 67; Emphasis in the original)
The cited passage from Ezekiel is presented below:
[Ezek 18:21] ... if the wicked man turns away from all the sins he committed, if he keeps all my statutes and does what is right and just, he shall surely live, he shall not die.
[Ezek 18:22] None of the crimes he committed shall be remembered against him; he shall live because of the virtue he has practiced.
[Ezek 18:23] Do I indeed derive any pleasure from the death of the wicked? says the Lord GOD. Do I not rather rejoice when he turns from his evil way that he may live?
[Ezek 18:24] And if the virtuous man turns from the path of virtue to do evil, the same kind of abominable things that the wicked man does, can he do this and still live? None of his virtuous deeds shall be remembered, because he has broken faith and committed sin; because of this, he shall die.
[Ezek 18:25] You say, "The LORD'S way is not fair!" Hear now, house of Israel: Is it my way that is unfair, or rather, are not your ways unfair?
[Ezek 18:26] When a virtuous man turns away from virtue to commit iniquity, and dies, it is because of the iniquity he committed that he must die.
[Ezek 18:27] But if a wicked man, turning from the wickedness he has committed, does what is right and just, he shall preserve his life;
[Ezek 18:28] since he has turned away from all the sins which he committed, he shall surely live, he shall not die.
[Ezek 18:29] And yet the house of Israel says, "The LORD'S way is not fair!" Is it my way that is not fair, house of Israel, or rather, is it not that your ways are not fair?
4. Recommendation
For the reasons cited above, I recommend that FO theories be omitted from all catecheses on sin and conscience.
REFERENCES
[GG]: Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus, Volume One: Christian Moral Principles, Franciscan Herald Press, 1983, ISBN 0-8199-0861-4 (v.1)
[PH] Persona Humana, Declaration on Certain Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics, Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 29 December 1975 (cf. Appendix 1).
[VS] Veritatis Splendor, Encyclical by Pope John Paul the Great, 6 August 1993 (cf. Appendix 2).
APPENDIX 1
EXCERPT FROM PERSONA HUMANA
REFERENCES
[GG]: Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus, Volume One: Christian Moral Principles, Franciscan Herald Press, 1983, ISBN 0-8199-0861-4 (v.1)
[PH] Persona Humana, Declaration on Certain Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics, Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 29 December 1975 (cf. Appendix 1).
[VS] Veritatis Splendor, Encyclical by Pope John Paul the Great, 6 August 1993 (cf. Appendix 2).
APPENDIX 1
EXCERPT FROM PERSONA HUMANA
The complete text from this excerpt has been extracted is found at the following URL:
http://www.ourladyswarriors.org/teach/pershuma.htm
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Quoted passages appear below in boldface.
[All emphases are in the original]
DeclarationOn Certain Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics
PERSONA HUMANA
GIVEN BY
Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith
ON DECEMBER 29, 1975
The observance of the moral law in the field of sexuality and the practice of chastity have been considerably endangered, especially among less fervent Christians, by the current tendency to minimize as far as possible, when not denying outright, the reality of grave sin, at least in people's actual lives.
There are those who go as far as to affirm that mortal sin, which causes separation from God, only exists in the formal refusal directly opposed to God's call, or in that selfishness which completely and deliberately closes itself to the love of neighbor. They say that it is only then that there comes into play the fundamental option, that is to say the decision which totally commits the person and which is necessary if mortal sin is to exist; by this option the person, from the depths of the personality, takes up or ratifies a fundamental attitude towards God or people. On the contrary, so-called "peripheral" actions (which, it is said, usually do not involve decisive choice), do not go so far as to change the fundamental option, the less so since they often come, as is observed, from habit. Thus such actions can weaken the fundamental option, but not to such a degree as to change it completely. Now according to these authors, a change of the fundamental option towards God less easily comes about in the field of sexual activity, where a person generally does not transgress the moral order in a fully deliberate and responsible manner but rather under the influence of passion, weakness, immaturity, sometimes even through the illusion of thus showing love for someone else. To these causes there is often added the pressure of the social environment.
In reality, it is precisely the fundamental option which in the last resort defines a person's moral disposition. But it can be completely changed by particular acts, especially when, as often happens, these have been prepared for by previous more superficial acts. Whatever the case, it is wrong to say that particular acts are not enough to constitute mortal sin.According to the Church's teaching, mortal sin, which is opposed to God, does not consist only in formal and direct resistance to the commandment of charity. It is equally to be found in this opposition to authentic love which is included in every deliberate transgression, in serious matter, of each of the moral laws.
Christ Himself has indicated the double commandment of love as the basis of the moral life. But on this commandment depends "the whole Law, and the Prophets also." It therefore includes the other particular precepts. In fact, to the young man who asked, ". . . what good deed must I do to possess eternal life?" Jesus replied: ". . . if you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments . . . . You must not kill. You must not commit adultery. You must not steal. You must not bring false witness. Honor your father and mother, and: you must love your neighbor as yourself."
A person therefore sins mortally not only when his action comes from direct contempt for love of God and neighbor, but also when he consciously and freely, for whatever reason, chooses something which is seriously disordered. For in this choice, as has been said above, there is already included contempt for the Divine commandment: the person turns himself away from God and loses charity.
APPENDIX 2
EXCERPT FROM VERITATIS SPLENDOR (PARAGRAPHS 65 THROUGH 70)
Encyclical of John Paul II
August 6, 1993
The complete text from which this excerpt has been extracted is found at the URL:
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-splendor_en.html
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Quoted passages appear below in boldface.[All emphases are in the original]
III. Fundamental choice and specific kinds of behavior
"Only do not use your freedom as an opportunity for the flesh" (Gal 5:13)
65. The heightened concern for freedom in our own day has led many students of the behavioral and the theological sciences to develop a more penetrating analysis of its nature and of its dynamics. It has been rightly pointed out that freedom is not only the choice for one or another particular action; it is also, within that choice, a decision about oneself and a setting of one's own life for or against the Good, for or against the Truth, and ultimately for or against God. Emphasis has rightly been placed on the importance of certain choices which "shape" a person's entire moral life, and which serve as bounds within which other particular everyday choices can be situated and allowed to develop.
Some authors, however, have proposed an even more radical revision of the relationship between person and acts. They speak of a "fundamental freedom", deeper than and different from freedom of choice, which needs to be considered if human actions are to be correctly understood and evaluated. According to these authors, the key role in the moral life is to be attributed to a "fundamental option", brought about by that fundamental freedom whereby the person makes an overall self-determination, not through a specific and conscious decision on the level of reflection, but in a "transcendental" and "athematic" way. Particular acts which flow from this option would constitute only partial and never definitive attempts to give it expression; they would only be its "signs" or symptoms. The immediate object of such acts would not be absolute Good (before which the freedom of the person would be expressed on a transcendental level), but particular (also termed "categorical" ) goods. In the opinion of some theologians, none of these goods, which by their nature are partial, could determine the freedom of man as a person in his totality, even though it is only by bringing them about or refusing to do so that man is able to express his own fundamental option.
A distinction thus comes to be introduced between the fundamental option and deliberate choices of a concrete kind of behavior. In some authors this division tends to become a separation, when they expressly limit moral "good" and "evil" to the transcendental dimension proper to the fundamental option, and describe as "right" or "wrong" the choices of particular "innerworldly" kinds of behavior: those, in other words, concerning man's relationship with himself, with others and with the material world. There thus appears to be established within human acting a clear disjunction between two levels of morality: on the one hand the order of good and evil, which is dependent on the will, and on the other hand specific kinds of behavior, which are judged to be morally right or wrong only on the basis of a technical calculation of the proportion between the "premoral" or "physical" goods and evils which actually result from the action. This is pushed to the point where a concrete kind of behavior, even one freely chosen, comes to be considered as a merely physical process, and not according to the criteria proper to a human act. The conclusion to which this eventually leads is that the properly moral assessment of the person is reserved to his fundamental option, prescinding in whole or in part from his choice of particular actions, of concrete kinds of behavior.
66. There is no doubt that Christian moral teaching, even in its Biblical roots, acknowledges the specific importance of a fundamental choice which qualifies the moral life and engages freedom on a radical level before God. It is a question of the decision of faith, of the obedience of faith (cf. Rom 16:26) "by which man makes a total and free self-commitment to God, offering 'the full submission of intellect and will to God as he reveals' ".112 This faith, which works through love (cf. Gal 5:6), comes from the core of man, from his "heart" (cf. Rom 10:10), whence it is called to bear fruit in works (cf. Mt 12:33-35; Lk 6:43-45; Rom 8:5-10; Gal 5:22). In the Decalogue one finds, as an introduction to the various commandments, the basic clause: "I am the Lord your God..." (Ex 20:2), which, by impressing upon the numerous and varied particular prescriptions their primordial meaning, gives the morality of the Covenant its aspect of completeness, unity and profundity. Israel's fundamental decision, then, is about the fundamental commandment (cf. Jos 24:14-25; Ex 19:3-8; Mic 6:8). The morality of the New Covenant is similarly dominated by the fundamental call of Jesus to follow him — thus he also says to the young man: "If you wish to be perfect... then come, follow me" (Mt 19:21); to this call the disciple must respond with a radical decision and choice. The Gospel parables of the treasure and the pearl of great price, for which one sells all one's possessions, are eloquent and effective images of the radical and unconditional nature of the decision demanded by the Kingdom of God. The radical nature of the decision to follow Jesus is admirably expressed in his own words: "Whoever would save his life will lose it; and whoever loses his life for my sake and the Gospel's will save it" (Mk 8:35).
Jesus' call to "come, follow me" marks the greatest possible exaltation of human freedom, yet at the same time it witnesses to the truth and to the obligation of acts of faith and of decisions which can be described as involving a fundamental option. We find a similar exaltation of human freedom in the words of Saint Paul: "You were called to freedom, brethren" (Gal 5:13). But the Apostle immediately adds a grave warning: "Only do not use your freedom as an opportunity for the flesh". This warning echoes his earlier words: "For freedom Christ has set us free; stand fast therefore, and do not submit again to a yoke of slavery" (Gal 5:1). Paul encourages us to be watchful, because freedom is always threatened by slavery. And this is precisely the case when an act of faith — in the sense of a fundamental option — becomes separated from the choice of particular acts, as in the tendencies mentioned above.
67. These tendencies are therefore contrary to the teaching of Scripture itself, which sees the fundamental option as a genuine choice of freedom and links that choice profoundly to particular acts. By his fundamental choice, man is capable of giving his life direction and of progressing, with the help of grace, towards his end, following God's call. But this capacity is actually exercised in the particular choices of specific actions, through which man deliberately conforms himself to God's will, wisdom and law. It thus needs to be stated that the so-called fundamental option, to the extent that it is distinct from a generic intention and hence one not yet determined in such a way that freedom is obligated, is always brought into play through conscious and free decisions. Precisely for this reason, it is revoked when man engages his freedom in conscious decisions to the contrary, with regard to morally grave matter.
To separate the fundamental option from concrete kinds of behavior means to contradict the substantial integrity or personal unity of the moral agent in his body and in his soul. A fundamental option understood without explicit consideration of the potentialities which it puts into effect and the determinations which express it does not do justice to the rational finality immanent in man's acting and in each of his deliberate decisions. In point of fact, the morality of human acts is not deduced only from one's intention, orientation or fundamental option, understood as an intention devoid of a clearly determined binding content or as an intention with no corresponding positive effort to fulfill the different obligations of the moral life. Judgments about morality cannot be made without taking into consideration whether or not the deliberate choice of a specific kind of behavior is in conformity with the dignity and integral vocation of the human person. Every choice always implies a reference by the deliberate will to the goods and evils indicated by the natural law as goods to be pursued and evils to be avoided. In the case of the positive moral precepts, prudence always has the task of verifying that they apply in a specific situation, for example, in view of other duties which may be more important or urgent. But the negative moral precepts, those prohibiting certain concrete actions or kinds of behavior as intrinsically evil, do not allow for any legitimate exception. They do not leave room, in any morally acceptable way, for the "creativity" of any contrary determination whatsoever. Once the moral species of an action prohibited by a universal rule is concretely recognized, the only morally good act is that of obeying the moral law and of refraining from the action which it forbids.
68. Here an important pastoral consideration must be added. According to the logic of the positions mentioned above, an individual could, by virtue of a fundamental option, remain faithful to God independently of whether or not certain of his choices and his acts are in conformity with specific moral norms or rules. By virtue of a primordial option for charity, that individual could continue to be morally good, persevere in God's grace and attain salvation, even if certain of his specific kinds of behavior were deliberately and gravely contrary to God's commandments as set forth by the Church.
In point of fact, man does not suffer perdition only by being unfaithful to that fundamental option whereby he has made "a free self-commitment to God". With every freely committed mortal sin, he offends God as the giver of the law and as a result becomes guilty with regard to the entire law (cf. Jas 2:8-11); even if he perseveres in faith, he loses "sanctifying grace", "charity" and "eternal happiness". As the Council of Trent teaches, "the grace of justification once received is lost not only by apostasy, by which faith itself is lost, but also by any other mortal sin".
Mortal and venial sin
69. As we have just seen, reflection on the fundamental option has also led some theologians to undertake a basic revision of the traditional distinction between mortal sins and venial sins. They insist that the opposition to God's law which causes the loss of sanctifying grace — and eternal damnation, when one dies in such a state of sin — could only be the result of an act which engages the person in his totality: in other words, an act of fundamental option. According to these theologians, mortal sin, which separates man from God, only exists in the rejection of God, carried out at a level of freedom which is neither to be identified with an act of choice nor capable of becoming the object of conscious awareness. Consequently, they go on to say, it is difficult, at least psychologically, to accept the fact that a Christian, who wishes to remain united to Jesus Christ and to his Church, could so easily and repeatedly commit mortal sins, as the "matter" itself of his actions would sometimes indicate. Likewise, it would be hard to accept that man is able, in a brief lapse of time, to sever radically the bond of communion with God and afterwards be converted to him by sincere repentance. The gravity of sin, they maintain, ought to be measured by the degree of engagement of the freedom of the person performing an act, rather than by the matter of that act.
70. The Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Reconciliatio et Paenitentia reaffirmed the importance and permanent validity of the distinction between mortal and venial sins, in accordance with the Church's tradition. And the 1983 Synod of Bishops, from which that Exhortation emerged, "not only reaffirmed the teaching of the Council of Trent concerning the existence and nature of mortal and venial sins, but it also recalled that mortal sin is sin whose object is grave matter and which is also committed with full knowledge and deliberate consent".
The statement of the Council of Trent does not only consider the "grave matter" of mortal sin; it also recalls that its necessary condition is "full awareness and deliberate consent". In any event, both in moral theology and in pastoral practice one is familiar with cases in which an act which is grave by reason of its matter does not constitute a mortal sin because of a lack of full awareness or deliberate consent on the part of the person performing it. Even so, "care will have to be taken not to reduce mortal sin to an act of 'fundamental option' — as is commonly said today — against God", seen either as an explicit and formal rejection of God and neighbor or as an implicit and unconscious rejection of love. "For mortal sin exists also when a person knowingly and willingly, for whatever reason, chooses something gravely disordered. In fact, such a choice already includes contempt for the divine law, a rejection of God's love for humanity and the whole of creation: the person turns away from God and loses charity. Consequently, the fundamental orientation can be radically changed by particular acts. Clearly, situations can occur which are very complex and obscure from a psychological viewpoint, and which influence the sinner's subjective imputability. But from a consideration of the psychological sphere one cannot proceed to create a theological category, which is precisely what the 'fundamental option' is, understanding it in such a way that it objectively changes or casts doubt upon the traditional concept of mortal sin".
The separation of fundamental option from deliberate choices of particular kinds of behavior, disordered in themselves or in their circumstances, which would not engage that option, thus involves a denial of Catholic doctrine on mortal sin: "With the whole tradition of the Church, we call mortal sin the act by which man freely and consciously rejects God, his law, the covenant of love that God offers, preferring to turn in on himself or to some created and finite reality, something contrary to the divine will (conversio ad creaturam). This can occur in a direct and formal way, in the sins of idolatry, apostasy and atheism; or in an equivalent way, as in every act of disobedience to God's commandments in a grave matter".
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